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ithin five years of Medicare’s enactment in
1965, liberal social activists Barbara and
John Ehrenreich conjured a new demon
— the “medical-industrial complex” — which they
associated with large, profit-seeking entities that were
supplanting individual physicians, acquiring political
influence, and plundering public funds.1 The choice of
words, of course, echoed those of conservative President Dwight Eisenhower, who in his televised Farewell
Address three days before leaving office in 1961 had
warned the nation of a “military-industrial complex.”
If one edits Eisenhower’s original text to substitute
“healthcare” for “military,” parallels emerge between
the American public’s fear of Communist invasion or
thermonuclear war and its fear of disease or death in
their potential for serious economic mischief.

William M. Sage

Our healthcare must be mighty, ready for instant
action.... Until the latest of our social welfare
laws, the United States had no healthcare industry…. But now we can no longer risk emergency
improvisation of national healthcare; we have
been compelled to create a permanent healthcare industry of vast proportions. Added to this,
fourteen and a half million men and women are
directly engaged in the healthcare establishment. We annually spend on healthcare security
more than the net income of all United States
corporations.
This conjunction of an immense healthcare
establishment and a large healthcare industry
is new in the American experience. The total
influence — economic, political, even spiritual
— is felt in every city, every State house, every
office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development.
Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave
implications.
In the councils of government, we must guard
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the healthcare-industrial complex.… Only an alert and
knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper
meshing of the huge industrial and healthcare
machinery with our non-health care methods
and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.2
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This “healthcare-industrial complex” has prospered
beyond expectation, with spending exceeding $3
trillion and accounting for nearly 18% of GDP and
approximately 10% of employment by 2014.3 Measured against other developed countries or against
“best practice” guidelines, health care in the U.S. costs
far more than it should for the benefits it provides.
At the same time, the health of the American public
lags those same benchmarks, particularly in terms of
obesity, physical inactivity, and the associated burden
of chronic disease. I have often described these as the
challenges of the ballpoint pen and the drive-through
French fry — two similarly shaped objects that represent in turn the inefficiency of fragmented care based

annual cost-sharing obligations under a basic health
insurance policy can be crippling. Our poorer citizens
enjoy less welfare support generally than in other
countries, and health disparities favoring the rich and
white are large and growing.4 And it is even harder for
individuals than for society as a whole to decide that
“enough” health care has been received, especially for
potentially serious medical conditions.
Health care spending is about science and ethics,
markets and government, freedom and community.
Whether one is an Ehrenreich or an Eisenhower, these
are inherently political conversations. None are easy
to sidestep, and few ever end. But they do change, and
tracing the evolution of political conversations about

This “healthcare-industrial complex” has prospered beyond expectation,
with spending exceeding $3 trillion and accounting for nearly 18% of
GDP and approximately 10% of employment by 2014. Measured against
other developed countries or against “best practice” guidelines, health care
in the U.S. costs far more than it should for the benefits it provides.
At the same time, the health of the American public lags those same
benchmarks, particularly in terms of obesity, physical inactivity,
and the associated burden of chronic disease.
on “doctor’s orders” and the poor lifestyle choices of
the American public. Solve either of these problems
and the cost curve will begin to bend; solve both and
health care expenditures should become sustainable
for a nation as wealthy as ours.
Collectively, health care spending was long viewed
as the acceptable price of scientific progress given
our national wealth. Roughly two decades ago, however, the governmental contribution to rising medical
costs began to force budgetary tradeoffs for scarce tax
dollars and add unacceptably to public debt — often
because organized health care interests could extract
sizeable rents through aggressive lobbying. More
recently, analysts have suggested that continued cost
growth in employment-based coverage is crowding
out cash raises in the private sector and decreasing
standards of living for American workers.
The cost problem is even more disturbing at a personal level. Illness is (very) unevenly distributed, and
severe illness can be impoverishing because it simultaneously imposes expense and diminishes earning
capacity. Even with “Obamacare,” coverage is not universal. Prices for recommended care are very high,
and cheaper alternatives are seldom available. Paying
for a single high-cost diagnostic test or meeting the
560

health care spending and their relationship to the formation of policy is a valuable exercise. Minding the Ps
of politics and policy in each of the conceptual-temporal phases discussed below enables one to identify the
Qs — the key questions that must be confronted going
forward to achieve substantial, sustained improvement in the affordability of the U.S. health care system.
What follows is a retelling of the recent history of
health spending and health policy. Although cost concerns in health care long predate the events described,5
by the late 1980s the unique upward trajectory of postMedicare U.S. health care spending had been established, recessions and tax cuts were eroding federal
and state budgets, and efforts to harness market forces
to serve policy goals were accelerating. From the initial writings on “managed competition” by Enthoven
and Kronick, through the failed Clinton health reform
effort in the early 1990s, to the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, the policy narrative of health
spending acquired a superficial consistency.6
On closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that the cost problem has been repeatedly reframed
in political discourse even during this relatively brief
period. The clearest transition has been from a narrative centered on rationing necessary care to one
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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committed to reducing wasteful care — although
the role of accumulated health law and professional
self-regulation in perpetuating waste remains largely
unrecognized and the recently articulated commitment to population health seems an imperfect proxy
for explicitly developing social solidarity with respect
to health and health care in the United States.

ter them, and proliferate acute care hospitals where
patients could receive them — made expanding
“access” an expensive proposition.7 Physicians, moreover, seemed able to “induce” demand for their services almost at will, so that each new graduate joining the medical workforce added cost to the system
rather than making it more competitive, as basic economics would predict. 8

If physicians are assumed to provide scientifically optimal medicine,
any unnecessary cost must come from elsewhere. A series of allegations
therefore targeted forces external, or at least tangential, to the doctor-patient
relationship. Chief among them was “defensive medicine,” a loosely defined,
imperfectly quantified belief that physicians fearing malpractice lawsuits
routinely performed expensive tests and procedures of little clinical benefit. In
addition to greedy trial lawyers, common villains in the profiteering narrative
included pharmaceutical and health insurance companies — large corporate
entities that lacked the individuality, local connections, and familiar ethics of
physicians and charitable hospitals.
Phase I Cost Control: “The Best Health Care
in the World”
When an economic downturn in the early 1990s
threatened jobs and the health insurance that stable
employment confers, universal coverage re-entered
the national policy agenda for the first time in a generation. The obstacle was cost: in harm to business
(if mandated of private employers) or in higher taxes
or ballooning deficits (if publicly financed), with the
third-party presidential candidate Ross Perot bringing
the arcana of government borrowing into mainstream
consciousness. Health care had reached 12%(!) of US
GDP by 1990, and serious commentators wondered
how much more we could afford.
Progress
Could the expected cost of universal coverage be
reduced? Not without jeopardizing the quality of
care, answered the cognoscenti, because — as virtually every American politician routinely declared —
health care in the United States was “the best in the
world.” Correspondingly, the prevailing health policy
narrative of the time declared that new technology,
much of it scientifically miraculous, was the principal driver of high health care spending. America’s
decision to prioritize “supply” — to develop new
treatments, train specialized physicians to adminis-

Power
There were supplementary explanations for high and
rising spending. Medicare’s deference to physicians
and lack of structural safeguards against cost overruns had bred an unholy alliance between America’s
seniors — active, single-issue voters with considerable
political influence — and an array of special interest
providers seeking to do business with government
on terms favorable to them.9 Passage of the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, a modest attempt
to place Medicare on a sounder actuarial footing by
raising premiums for higher-income seniors, provoked such a strong backlash that Congress was forced
to repeal it before its effective date. This sent a shockwave through the Beltway that discouraged policy
innovation, and made Medicare into an untouchable
“third rail” for the health reform debate that followed.

Profiteers
If physicians are assumed to provide scientifically optimal medicine, any unnecessary cost must come from
elsewhere. A series of allegations therefore targeted
forces external, or at least tangential, to the doctorpatient relationship. Chief among them was “defensive medicine,” a loosely defined, imperfectly quantified belief that physicians fearing malpractice lawsuits
routinely performed expensive tests and procedures
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of little clinical benefit.10 Absent an acute crisis in the
availability (mid-1970s) or affordability (mid-1980s)
of physicians’ malpractice insurance, reducing costly
defensive medicine became the principal argument in
favor of tort reform. In addition to greedy trial lawyers,
common villains in the profiteering narrative included
pharmaceutical and health insurance companies —
large corporate entities that lacked the individuality,
local connections, and familiar ethics of physicians
and charitable hospitals.
Paperwork
The predations of the accused profiteers fed a general
belief that “waste, fraud, and abuse” — again loosely
defined but excluding bona fide clinical activities —
was a major drain on health care coffers.11 The political consensus to eliminate it through stricter oversight resulted in a general bureaucratic escalation.
More regulation on the payer side required greater
investment in both compliance and evasion on the
provider side, a pattern that was most pronounced in
government reimbursement programs but that was
replicated by private insurers seeking to reduce their
claims payouts — which in turn provoked public concern over both profits and high administrative costs
crowding out payment for necessary medical services
(the poorly named “medical loss ratio”).
This “Phase I” conceptualization of the health care
cost problem had its intellectual apotheosis in a 1994
book by Dr. William Kissick.12 Portraying health policy as an “iron triangle” of cost, access, and quality,
Kissick argued that society’s “finite resources” could
never meet its “infinite demand” for medical care.
Although Kissick’s cost dilemma was largely a testament to medicine’s success, his formulation was
unappealing to both politicians and physicians. For
government to solve the health care cost problem, it
had to reach a definitive political settlement regarding limits that had failed in the 1970s under the
rubric “health planning,” and was patently unachievable in the 1990s.13 For the profession to solve the cost
problem, it had to endorse forms of rationing that ran
contrary to established ethics and threatened to drain
patient care of its greatest satisfactions, both psychic
and material.14
Only one U.S. state confronted the purported cost
drivers of health care head-on. Through an explicit,
highly visible process that included both clinicaltechnical expertise and democratic participation, the
Oregon Health Plan (OHP) broadened Medicaid to
a larger group of beneficiaries but guaranteed coverage only for condition-specific treatments meeting
cost-effectiveness standards.15 Rationing health care
patient-by-patient was a radical reconceptualization
562

of health insurance, though the approach suffered by
accepting reported costs as real costs, not questioning
the organization or efficiency of care delivery, and failing to invest in health at the population level.
OHP’s reception in Washington, D.C., was hostile,
with the first Bush administration denying a Medicaid
waiver on Americans with Disabilities Act grounds,
but likely viewing any formalized process of health
care rationing as defeatist and un-American. Oregon
itself struggled with the harshness of the priorities its
analysis had generated, and by the time OHP received
a waiver from the Clinton administration, much of its
prioritization process had been eviscerated, and what
little data-driven rationing remained was supplanted
shortly thereafter by moving Medicaid beneficiaries
into private managed care.16
Dissonance between policy rationale and political reality also plagued the unsuccessful effort to expand coverage nationally in 1993-94. The Clinton administration’s
political advisers led it down the path of “managed competition,” mandating coverage through employers that
would be provided by private health plans competing
on cost and quality in a structured marketplace.17 While
managed competition has much to commend it, and had
formed the backbone of the embryonic coverage expansion that President Nixon did not remain in office long
enough to gestate, it was at odds with the administrative
cost critique emphasized by President Clinton’s health
reform czar, Ira Magaziner. If administrative expense
and profiteering were the major sources of excess spending, a single-payer plan would have been a more suitable
policy prescription. But a centrist Democrat following a
dozen years of Republican rule could not easily embrace
“socialized medicine,” particularly when balanced budgets had acquired political salience. Nor would the Clinton White House consider rationing care using explicit
controls on coverage. Prominent bioethicists drawn to
the reform effort by the perceived necessity of ethically
allocating scarce medical resources were soon diverted
to other tasks.

Phase II Cost Control: The Kaiser Fallacy
In the 1990s and 2000s, the United States tried to
contain health care costs using private “managed
care.” The poster child for managed care has always
been Kaiser Permanente, a group-model HMO with a
75-year history that — most everyone agrees — delivers excellent health care to its members. It is only a
slight exaggeration to say that President Nixon signed
the HMO Act of 1973 to help Kaiser-like organizations overcome the AMA’s longstanding opposition
to prepaid practice, and that proponents of managed
competition in the 1980s imagined a world of competing Kaisers. But the factors that made Kaiser sucjournal of law, medicine & ethics
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cessful were not generally understood 20 years ago,
especially in the Beltway, and were hard to replicate
outside of California using private physician practices
and community hospitals.
Even more importantly, policymakers turned to
managed care without reframing the cost problem
they were trying to solve. Although the shift hinted
at the importance of “delivery system reform” to cost
control, many viewed the failure of the Clinton administration’s effort primarily as confirming the weakness of government as a limiting force. Handicapped
by politics and by legal requirements of due process,
it could not exclude greedy or incompetent providers, it could not resist special interests, and it could
not ration care. Perhaps, they thought, private health
plans looking out for their own financial interests
would be better at saying, “No!”18
Patchwork
Organized systems of care such as Kaiser seemed
uniquely able to streamline the delivery of care without sacrificing quality and safety. Health services
research begun in the 1970s had revealed substantial,
unexpected geographic variation in medical treatment
that was not associated with either greater needs or
superior outcomes.19 “Best practices” were seldom
available, and clear advances in medical knowledge
took years to diffuse into communities and alter the
habits of local physicians. “Fragmentation” was also
structural: most physicians continued to work in
undercapitalized solo or small-group practices; hospitals competed for physician referrals by amassing
expensive technologies with little attention to their
necessity; and the results of care were essentially
unmeasurable.20 Kaiser’s physicians and hospitals,
by contrast, were dedicated to their members, coordinated care among themselves, avoided duplication,
followed standardized guidelines, and could be held
accountable for both costs and outcomes as a unit.
Prepaid Care
The core logic of the HMO approach involved a convergence of coverage and care at the health plan level,
with plans receiving an annual “capitated” premium
(i.e., a per enrollee payment) and taking responsibility
for providing necessary care to a defined population
of members. State Medicaid programs, and to some
degree Medicare, pursued similar strategies as the private sector, anticipating that it would be easier to deal
with a small number of competing health plans than
legions of individual providers.
In Kaiser itself, physicians are salaried and the organization tracks member health and health care rather
than processing claims to “reimburse” itemized ser-

vices. Kaiser even assumes liability at the health plan
level for malpractice claims against its affiliated physicians. In this way, patients enjoy one-stop shopping
while the worst impulses of providers to over-treat,
and of insurers to undertreat, are counterbalanced. In
return for these benefits, members of Kaiser-like managed care organizations give up their right to coverage
of services from unaffiliated physicians and hospitals.
Services received within the organization, however,
are covered on very favorable terms, with low deductibles and co-payments.
Prevention
The managed care era brought the potential costsavings of preventive care into serious policy debate.
Preventive care is undervalued by physicians and hospitals, who are more likely to be called on when serious illnesses arise and who are better paid to respond
to them. As the term implies, “health maintenance
organizations” are intended to prevent disease as well
as treat it. Because members receive care exclusively
from the HMO over a period of years, the theory goes,
the HMO has a financial incentive to invest in prevention, including regular screening, early diagnosis, and
prompt treatment. Preventive care is also usually free
to members so that they will access it routinely.
Purchasers
Managed care was supposed to control cost in part
because purchasers would become as organized as
integrated insurer-providers. For this reason, the
Clinton health reform had created “health alliances”
(originally called “health insurance purchasing cooperatives”) that were the policy progenitors of the ACA’s
insurance exchanges. Pooled purchasing, the advantages of which had already been demonstrated by
large employers, saved money by creating more stable
risk pools, generating economies of scale in enrollment and administration, and conferring greater
bargaining power on the buyer. The cost disadvantages of employer purchasing were that it attenuated the connection between available coverage and
individual preferences, and that it added a large taxpayer subsidy to health care that further reduced price
consciousness.
The managed care experiment failed. Competing
Kaisers never materialized. In retrospect, it was asking
too much.21 Closed-panel HMOs prosper in a few parts
of the country where both patients and physicians are
acculturated to them. Moreover, they require massive
capital investment. Physicians in private practice elsewhere were not about to migrate en masse to corporate entities whose facilities were unbuilt and whose
businesses were untested. The flawed alternative
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was to assemble “virtual” HMOs by contract, leaving
physicians and hospitals as structurally fragmented
as before but relying on financial incentives to break
providers of their profligate habits. And interposing
“gatekeeper” physicians and preauthorization requirements between patients and the specialized care they
were accustomed to receiving. Making things worse,
the insurers and intermediaries who stepped forward
to serve the market were often new, for-profit entities
with ambitious executives and strict earnings targets.
Given the high level of annual churn in enrollment,
long-term investment in health proved unprofitable,
and public confidence in quality and trustworthiness
evaporated.
The backlash came quickly.22 Faced with employee
unrest (and buoyed by a sound economy), private
employers retreated as active purchasers while politicians, encouraged by lobbyists protecting provider
interests, seized on the shift in public opinion. Nearly
all states passed “patient protection” acts. Congress
was more restrained, but one high-profile law it
enacted — the “Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996” — made abundantly clear from
its title and content (guaranteeing generous private
coverage for post-delivery hospitalization) that even
transparent, scientifically reasonable measures limiting care for generally healthy and economically
secure individuals were politically unacceptable.23
Private rationing would be no easier than public
rationing.
When the dust settled on “Phase II,” little progress had been made, and cost growth — which had
briefly stalled — accelerated again. Streamlined
organizations like Kaiser remained rare, with most
managed care gravitating to large Blue Cross plans
that contracted unselectively (and sometimes unaggressively) with every hospital and nearly every
physician. Under these conditions, premiums for
prevention-oriented HMO-style products became
unaffordable, and — boosted by the rising political
fortunes of conservative Republicans who blamed
costs on moral hazard and the welfare state — health
insurance coverage itself became seen as the problem
rather than the solution.
The result was a far less transparent shift of financial
responsibility from insurers and employers to insured
workers and patients in the form of high deductibles
and co-insurance. This movement (ironically called
“consumer-directed care”) was billed as cultivating
savvy buyers who had “skin in the game,” but served
mainly to conceal continued growth in health care
costs by moving it from visible premiums to less visible individual and family debt. By the time this was
generally known, a national economic collapse unre564

lated to health care had intervened, and a new Democratic administration took over — promising universal
health coverage as a prerequisite to financial security
and opportunity.

Phase III Cost Control: Information,
Incentives, and Value
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 (ACA) was an ambitious and risky endeavor. It
attempted to expand health coverage to nearly all citizens, but not saddle the country with even more debt
than existing entitlement programs — notably Medicare — had already created. It maintained many of
the premises of 1990s-style managed competition, yet
never spoke the words “managed care” above a whisper. Most importantly, it simultaneously engaged all
three parts of the health reform puzzle — health insurance, health care delivery, and the underlying health
of individuals and communities.
Skeptics immediately labeled it a giveaway to a few
and a takeaway from the rest, and whether the ACA
can credibly offer something to everyone remains an
open question. But there were reasons beyond overconfidence why universalizing an already-too-costly
health care system was the majority’s political choice.
These included three related beliefs, each backed by
research: that the insured were already paying a lot for
the uninsured, that these shifted expenditures were
made greater (and their benefits diminished) by lack
of attention to “social determinants” of health, and
that perverse incentives and lack of information made
the existing health care system massively wasteful.
Rhetoric regarding the “best health care in the world”
receded; “delivery system reform” became a consensus
objective.24
Productivity
By 2010, the intellectual mantle of health care cost
control had passed from the Kissicks of the post-Medicare generation, alighted briefly on conservative theorists of health savings accounts, and wrapped itself
firmly around the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) and its founder, pediatrician and former
Harvard Community Health Plan quality leader Don
Berwick. Examining quality, management, and the
rise in chronic disease, IHI distilled its reform goals
into a “Triple Aim”: improving the patient experience of care, improving the health of populations, and
reducing per capita costs.25
This “value-based” analysis was bolstered by
authoritative reports from the Institute of Medicine
and others that demonstrated major safety lapses, a
“quality chasm,” and nearly a trillion dollars in annual
waste.26 In asserting that the component parts of the
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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Triple Aim are simultaneously achievable, Berwick’s
formulation had an immediate advantage over Kissick’s. Instead of requiring a definitive political settlement regarding limits on resource use (e.g., the ACA’s
apocryphal “death panels”), the Triple Aim called only
for iterative, incremental improvements — hard tradeoffs being premature when so many mutually beneficial efficiency gains are possible.27
Processing
A clear divergence between health care and ostensibly
efficient industries is the latter’s much greater use of
21st century information and communications technologies. To its proponents, Health IT can facilitate
coordination of care using Electronic Health Records
and Health Information Exchanges; communicate
information that is more timely and accurate; offer
alerts to improve safety and decision support to boost
quality; expand access to services through inexpensive telehealth modalities; and measure processes and
results to enable efficient production, informed consumer choice, and public accountability. The George
W. Bush administration created the Office of National
Coordinator for Health IT by executive order in 2004,
and its funding increased substantially under HITECH
(part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act)
and the ACA. Early supply-side assistance to developers of platforms and software eventually gave way to a
demand-side “pull strategy” with financial incentives
for “meaningful use” by hospitals and physicians, but
overall enthusiasm has remained strong.
Payment
Fee-for-service medicine can be blamed for many perversities in the existing health care system. Procedures
are overused. Physicians neglect simple preventive
measures in favor of complex therapeutic ones. Because
health professionals and health facilities bill separately,
production is uncoordinated. Avoiding complications
reduces profit rather than raising it. Defensive medicine enhances revenue without adding value. Maximizing “reimbursement” adds to administrative overhead
and increases the potential for fraud. For these reasons,
“alternative payment systems” and “risk-based contracting” are universally praised, if incompletely specified,
by the current generation of policymakers.28 Depending on the size and nature of the organization receiving it, “value-based” payment can include care bundles
or episodes, “reference pricing,” and various forms of
“shared savings” ranging from modest bonuses for efficient performance to globally capitated payments that
place providers at full financial risk.29

Performance
“Accountable care” has replaced “managed care” in the
cost-control lexicon. Quality assessment before the
1990s was largely an academic exercise, and entered
the policy mainstream only when the public began to
doubt the loyalty and competence of physicians who
seemed increasingly in thrall to managed care organizations. But one cannot pay for value unless one can
measure it, and avoiding another backlash requires
an information-rich environment for both patients
and providers. Performance metrics, therefore, have
proliferated in the post-ACA health care system. New
metrics range across care processes, clinical outcomes,
patient experiences, and population health improvement, and are adaptable to both traditional settings
and new delivery models such as accountable care
organizations and patient-centered medical homes.30
Nearly half the states have also put in place All-Payer
Claims Databases to facilitate quality measurement and empower both consumers and regulators,
although the states’ power to mandate reporting by
self-insured ERISA plans was recently limited by the
Supreme Court.31
Prices
High service and input prices contribute significantly
to overall U.S. health care spending.32 Patients seldom
know the price or quality of their care in advance of
receiving it. Policies to make quality more transparent
to consumers began in the 1990s to help monitor the
cost-cutting activities of managed care organizations.
Making price more transparent began in the 2000s, in
part to facilitate prudent purchasing in high-deductible health plans. Still, recent analyses have exposed
hospital pricing that continues to be both exorbitant
and arbitrary.33 Pharmaceutical prices are also notably
higher in the U.S. than abroad; sharp increases in prices
for established drugs as well as new biological entities
have renewed interest in government negotiating or
controlling prices. Corporate consolidation amplifies
these pricing concerns — large hospitals can gain market power or dominant hospitals and dominant insurers can lock out competitors for their mutual benefit
— which may require stronger antitrust enforcement
to prevent.34 More generally, arbitrary and variable
pricing suggests that many health care providers do
not understand their own cost structures, which bodes
poorly for improving productive efficiency.
Populations
The chronic disease burden associated with poor
nutrition, insufficient physical activity, and other
lifestyle factors, combined with overall population
aging, threatens a substantial increase in health care
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spending.35 Health care and public health — historically related fields that drifted apart in the 20th century — have been brought together again by a series
of challenges such as AIDS/HIV, tobacco control, biopreparedness, pandemic influenza, substance abuse,
environmental exposures, and child and adult obesity.
Drawing on research mapping the social determinants
of health and documenting disparities that unfairly
burden low-income and minority populations, the
ACA has accelerated the coalescence of individual and
population health management. ACA-related population health initiatives include accountable care organi-

already endangered the ACA’s “Cadillac tax” on very
expensive employee health benefits, a reform widely
supported by health policy experts but lacking the
social solidarity needed to justify it politically. Dislodging long-standing industry practices also seems
to require a top-down approach in many instances,
particularly through Medicare policy. However, lack
of attention to why the health care system is so persistently inefficient, notably its accretion of self-protective professional regulation at the state as well as the
federal level, decreases the likelihood that missteps in
the reform process will be self-correcting.

In other words, health care cost control depends critically on resurgent belief,
both medical and social, in compassion and community as well as clinical
capability and consumerism. It cannot be coincidental that both Don Berwick
and Avedis Donabedian, luminaries of health care quality improvement, came
late in their careers to emphasize personal service and social consciousness over
technical achievement. Berwick’s view, recently stated, is that “[w]ithout a new
moral ethos, there will be no winners.” Donabedian, in an interview conducted
shortly before his death, put it even more directly: “The secret of quality is love.”

zations, community workforce investments, and hospital-generated community health needs assessments.
Although the Triple Aim reflects a profound rethinking of health policy, it is too soon to tell whether the payment reform and information exchange that embody
“Phase III” cost control will prove effective remedies
for waste and inefficiency. A welcome post-ACA dip in
health care spending may have been only transitory,
and early returns on accountable care organizations
and bundled payment programs are mixed.36 Incentives and information may bring people to the table
and begin conversations, but may not change behavior. Recognized problems include overshoot in the
number and complexity of accountability metrics and
“meaningful use” standards, difficulties attributing
outcomes when several providers share responsibility
for a given patient’s care, rewarding inefficient providers for improvement rather than efficient providers for
achievement, and limitations associated with using
claims data rather than clinical data to monitor and
improve performance.37
The role of government in fostering efficiency is
also unsettled. The current generation of reforms is
more market-oriented than collective, with President
Obama tending to equate the interests of “consumers”
with those of “the American public.”38 This bias has
566

Looking Ahead to Phase IV: Revisiting
Law and Culture
A truism of management consulting is that “culture
eats strategy for breakfast.”39 Three cultures are relevant to health care: professional, personal, and
political. Engaging these cultures is likely to lie at the
heart of any successful effort to reconcile health care
spending with other critical uses of public and private
resources.
At the professional level, changing the culture is
made easier by a new generation of practitioners,
who are more diverse in their professional skills and
training, and more willing than their predecessors to
embrace clinical redesign and population health management.40 However, it also will be necessary to reexamine and begin to unwind a century of regulatory
and self-regulatory protectionism that constitutes the
deep legal architecture of the health care system, and
that may largely be responsible for its inefficiency.41
At the personal level, genuine participation by individuals in setting health goals, exploring medical and
non-medical options, and managing health-related
decisions is indispensable to obtaining better value
from the health care system. For situations in which
a market framework is appropriate, health care products must be available that meet individuals’ needs,
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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are sold on a fully assembled basis, and include warranties for basic quality and safety like other complex
consumer goods.42
At the political level, promoting health and providing health care must become expressions of patriotism
in America, as they are elsewhere in the world. 43 In
particular, the crippling multi-generational effects of
endemic poverty on education and health, and therefore on economic and social opportunity, can no longer be ignored.44 This collective commitment is necessary not only to salvage scarce financial resources
from low-value health care uses — only some of which
constitute pure “waste” — but also to identify highervalue social uses and channel saved resources toward
them.
In other words, health care cost control depends
critically on resurgent belief, both medical and social,
in compassion and community as well as clinical capability and consumerism. It cannot be coincidental that
both Don Berwick and Avedis Donabedian, luminaries of health care quality improvement, came late in
their careers to emphasize personal service and social
consciousness over technical achievement. Berwick’s
view, recently stated, is that “[w]ithout a new moral
ethos, there will be no winners.”45 Donabedian, in an
interview conducted shortly before his death, put it
even more directly: “The secret of quality is love.”46
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